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STAYING NEUTRAL: HOW WASHINGTON STATE
COURTS SHOULD APPROACH NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION CLAIMS AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS
Kelly H. Sheridan
Abstract: The torts of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention place a duty on
employers to prevent their employees from using the places, things, or tasks entrusted to
them to harm foreseeable victims. The negligent employment torts create an independent
duty under which plaintiffs may pursue an action when suits brought under a vicarious
liability or breach of fiduciary duty theory would fail. For victims of sexual misconduct by
religious leaders, negligent supervision claims against religious organizations are a crucial
means of remedying serious and lasting injuries. Washington state law recognizes negligent
supervision, and Washington courts have applied it to religious organizations, but these
claims typically implicate First Amendment religious freedom concerns. A short series of
Washington appellate cases affirming grants of summary judgment to religious organization
defendants on First Amendment grounds has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to assert
negligent supervision claims against religious entities. This Comment argues that
Washington courts have granted religious organizations an impermissibly broad level of First
Amendment protection from claims of negligent supervision, and suggests a more deliberate
analytical framework for evaluating the constitutionality of such claims.

INTRODUCTION
Despite increased public awareness following the child molestation
scandals that plagued the Catholic Church during the 1990s, incidence of
sexual misconduct by religious leaders is still shockingly widespread.1
This misconduct is a prominent problem in American society, and the
tort of negligent supervision is an essential mechanism both for
preventing it and for remedying the harm it causes. When individuals
file negligent supervision suits against religious organizations, state
courts are forced to navigate a distinct pair of directives: the dual
1. See Executive Summary, Diana R. Garland, The Prevalence of Clergy Sexual Misconduct with
Adults: A Research Study Executive Summary (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.baylor.edu/clergysexual
misconduct/index.php?id=67406 (discussing comprehensive 2009 study finding that one in thirtythree American adult women who go to church regularly has been the victim of a sexual advance by
her religious leader). Many such cases appear far more egregious than the illicit tryst at issue in
S.H.C. v. Lu, infra Part IV.C., with some religious leaders molesting legions of vulnerable minors
and religious organizations engaging in elaborate suppression campaigns. See, e.g., Laurie
Goodstein, Vatican Declined to Defrock U.S. Priest Who Abused Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010,
at A1.
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mandates of the First Amendment’s religion clauses and the general
right of the aggrieved to seek recourse through the court system.2 What
are courts to do if the elements of a plaintiff’s claim require them to
make sensitive interpretive judgments about a religion’s doctrine or
practice?
In the 1979 case Jones v. Wolf,3 the Supreme Court articulated a
framework for courts to use when analyzing whether they can adjudicate
common-law claims against religious organizations without violating the
First Amendment.4 State courts have applied this framework in a variety
of ways, including a categorical bar against such claims, a categorical
allowance of such claims, and a case-by-case inquiry into whether the
elements of the claims would require interpretation of the relevant
religious doctrine.5 In the context of common-law negligent supervision
claims, the Washington State Supreme Court has expressed approval of
the latter case-by-case inquiry.6 Several recent Washington State Court
of Appeals decisions, however, have employed broad language in
rejecting negligent supervision suits on First Amendment grounds,
creating strong precedent against such claims.7
This Comment begins in Part I by examining the tort of negligent
supervision under Washington law. Part II contains a general exposition
of recent First Amendment jurisprudence, giving special attention to the
landmark Supreme Court case of Jones v. Wolf. Part III examines the
various approaches state courts employ in analyzing whether tort claims
against religious organizations can be permissibly adjudicated within the
constraints of the First Amendment. Part IV discusses how Washington
courts have previously handled this issue, and examines in detail two
recent appellate cases rejecting negligent supervision suits against
religious organizations on First Amendment grounds. Finally, in Part V,
this Comment argues that Washington courts should read this line of
cases narrowly and apply the neutral principles approach articulated in
Jones v. Wolf when analyzing tort claims against religious organizations.

2. See infra Part II.
3. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
4. Id. at 604–07.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 729, 985 P.2d 262,
277 (1999).
7. See infra Parts IV.B. and C.
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THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION IMPOSES AN
INDEPENDENT DUTY ON EMPLOYERS TO PREVENT
EMPLOYEES FROM ENDANGERING OTHERS

The torts of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention (“negligent
employment torts”) place an affirmative duty on employers to prevent
their employees from causing foreseeable harm to third persons using
the tasks, premises, or instrumentalities entrusted to them.8 This duty
applies regardless of whether employees are acting within the scope of
their prescribed duties, which distinguishes negligent employment
claims from vicarious liability in both concept and application.9 For
injured parties whose claims would fail under a vicarious liability
theory, the negligent supervision action is an indispensible means to
recovery.
A.

Negligent Supervision Imposes a Limited Duty on Employers to
Prevent Employees from Causing Foreseeable Harm to Third
Persons

The negligent employment torts impose a duty on employers to
exercise reasonable care to prevent employees from harming others,
even where the employee is acting outside of the scope of employment.10
Claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention share similar
elements, and are distinguishable only by the stage of employment in
which the tortious conduct arises.11 Washington courts did not begin to
recognize negligent supervision as a cause of action until the latter half
of the twentieth century,12 and have been hesitant to assign liability to
the schools, group homes, and medical clinics that are typically the
8. See Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 48, 929 P.2d 420, 425–26 (1997); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
9. See Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 48, 929 P.2d at 425–26.
10. See Peck v. Siau, 65 Wash. App. 285, 294, 827 P.2d 1108, 1113, review denied, 120 Wash.
2d 1005, 838 P.2d 1142 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)); see also
Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 51, 929 P.2d at 420 (“The theory of negligent supervision creates a limited
duty to control an employee for the protection of third parties, even where the employee is acting
outside the scope of employment.”).
11. See Peck, 65 Wash. App. at 288, 827 P.2d at 1110 (“The difference between negligent hiring
and negligent retention is the time at which the employer’s negligence occurs. With negligent
hiring, it occurs at the time of hiring; with negligent retention, it occurs in the course of
employment.”).
12. See, e.g., La Lone v. Smith, 39 Wash. 2d 167, 172, 234 P.2d 893, 896 (1951) (affirming
employer liability for negligently retaining employee “because the employer antecedently had
reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 213 (1933))).
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target of such claims.13 Washington courts, however, have definitively
acknowledged the viability of these suits as a means of seeking redress
where other methods of recovering for employee misconduct fail for
scope of employment or statute of limitations reasons.14 Plaintiffs have
successfully asserted that religious organizations may be liable under the
negligent supervision theory,15 but such claims typically evoke strong
First Amendment defenses.16
Liability for negligent supervision arises out of the employment
relationship and is predicated on the employer’s furnishing of places,
things, or duties later used to commit negligent or intentional wrongs.17
For an employer to be liable for negligent supervision, the employer
must know or have reason to know of both (1) its ability to control the
employee and (2) the necessity of exercising such control to prevent
harm to third persons.18 Washington courts have interpreted the second
element to require a showing that the employer knew or had reason to
know that the particular employee presented a risk of harm to others.19
Furthermore, the employee must be on the employer’s premises or using
an employer’s chattel when the harm occurs.20 To establish that the
employer’s negligence was the proximate cause of their injury, plaintiffs
must demonstrate that the negligent or intentional act of the employee
was foreseeable.21 Imposing liability for negligent supervision supports
the public policy goals of providing a fallback remedy for injured

13. See, e.g., Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 53, 929 P.2d at 428 (rejecting negligent supervision claim
against nursing home); Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 71 Wash. App. 548, 556, 860 P.2d 1054, 1059
(1993) (refusing to hold medical clinic liable for doctor’s sexual assault); Scott v. Blanchet High
School, 50 Wash. App. 37, 45, 747 P.2d 1124, 1128 (1987) (refusing to hold school liable for
negligent supervision of teacher).
14. See, e.g., Scott, 50 Wash. App. at 44, 747 P.2d at 1128 (“Negligent supervision of an
employee is a recognized cause of action.”).
15. See C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 727, 985 P.2d 262,
276 (1999).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See Peck v. Siau, 65 Wash. App. 285, 294, 827 P.2d 1108, 1113, review denied, 120 Wash.
2d 1005, 838 P.2d 1142 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)).
18. See id.
19. Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 52, 929 P.2d 420, 427–28 (1997)
(“Washington cases have generally interpreted the knowledge element to require a showing of
knowledge of the dangerous tendencies of the particular employee.”).
20. See Peck, 65 Wash. App. at 294, 827 P.2d at 1113 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 317 (1965)).
21. See Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 51, 929 P.2d at 427.
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persons and encouraging employers to take affirmative steps to prevent
the foreseeable torts of their employees.22
B.

The Tort of Negligent Supervision Is Functionally Distinct from
Other Employment-Related Torts

Negligent supervision imposes a duty that is “analytically distinct and
separate”23 from the vicarious liability theory, which imposes liability on
an employer for the torts of an employee who is acting on the
employer’s behalf.24 Unlike the agency theory of the common-law
doctrine of respondeat superior, which requires employers to answer for
the wrongs of their employees, negligent supervision claims attach
liability directly to the employer for a breach of the employer’s own
independent duty of due care.25 Thus, claims of negligent employment
can be a viable means of redress even when claims against the principal
tortfeasor do not succeed due to failure of proof or statute of limitations
restrictions.26 Furthermore, while an employer’s vicarious liability is
limited to the employee’s actions within the scope of that employee’s
employment and on the employer’s behalf,27 the scope of employer
liability under a negligent supervision theory is limited only by the
foreseeability that the employee presented a risk of harm to others.28 In
the context of claims based on sexual misconduct, negligent supervision
is a critical means of recovery because sexual acts typically occur in
contexts outside of the scope of employment.
22. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004
BYU L. REV. 1789, 1858 (2004).
23. Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 48, 929 P.2d at 426.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Scott v. Blanchet High School, 50 Wash. App. 37, 45, 747 P.2d 1124, 1128
(1987)).
26. See Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92 Wash. 2d 507, 511, 598 P.2d 1358, 1360 (1979)
(holding that tort claims do not accrue for statute of limitations purposes “until [the defendant]
discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible cause
of action”). Under the discovery rule, if the plaintiff learns of the employer’s knowledge that the
employee presented a risk of harm after the conduct occurs, they can potentially recover from the
employer for negligent supervision even after the statute of limitations period for claims against the
employee has expired; under a vicarious liability theory, claims against the employer expire along
with claims against the employee. But cf. Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church, 96 Wash. App. 826,
835, 980 P.2d 809, 814 (1999) (affirming trial court’s ruling that discovery rule did not apply in
negligent supervision suit against church because plaintiffs had constructive knowledge that
deacons concealed pastor’s misconduct).
27. See Kuehn v. White, 24 Wash. App. 274, 277, 600 P.2d 679, 681 (1979).
28. See Niece, 131 Wash. 2d at 48, 929 P.2d at 426 (“[T]he scope of employment is not a limit on
an employer’s liability for a breach of its own duty of care.”).
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II.

FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE ALLOWS COURTS TO
APPLY NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN TORT CASES
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

The First Amendment’s guarantee of religious freedom represents an
outer constraint on the ability of federal, state, and local governments to
pass or enforce laws pertaining to religious exercise. The trajectory of
the United States Supreme Court’s application of this principle reflects a
general shift from an early paradigm of separationism to a modern
paradigm of neutrality.29 This trend is reflected in the Court’s decisions
in both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause contexts.
The shift from separationism to neutrality is exemplified by the Court’s
1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf,30 which held that courts may adjudicate
common-law claims against religious organizations within the confines
of the First Amendment if those claims can be decided solely on neutral
principles of law.31
A.

First Amendment Doctrine Predominantly Requires Government
Neutrality with Respect to Religion

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
pertinent part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”32
Read together, these two clauses provide dual boundaries on government
action that relates to religion: protection and establishment. Courts
applying laws that impact religious organizations must walk a “tight
rope” between these two priorities.33 In order to afford religious bodies
sufficient autonomy and freedom of belief without contravening the
constitutional prohibition on established religion, courts interpreting the
First Amendment have attempted to “preserv[e] doctrinal flexibility and
recogniz[e] the need for a sensible and realistic application of the
religion clauses.”34 While the religion clauses refer specifically to

29. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43
B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (2002) (describing Establishment Clause doctrine as historically informed
by the “mutually antagonistic values” of separation and neutrality).
30. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
31. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602–03.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[W]e have been able to chart a course
that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of
established religion. This is a ‘tight rope’ and one we have successfully traversed.” (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970))).
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actions taken by the federal government, both the first (“Establishment
Clause”) and second (“Free Exercise Clause”) clauses of the First
Amendment apply to the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment.35
1.

First Amendment Jurisprudence Has Shifted from Outright
Separationism to Neutrality

Application of the two principles of the religion clauses has taken a
trajectory commonly described as a move from a separationist to a
neutrality-based conception of the First Amendment.36 Separationism
evokes the strict “wall of separation between Church & State”
historically associated with the First Amendment,37 requiring that
“[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can . . . participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”38
Neutrality, on the other hand, does not presume that incidental
government involvement in religious matters is illegitimate, as long as
such involvement is generally applicable and neutral both “between
religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion.”39 While
the rise of a neutrality-based conception of the religion clauses has
profoundly affected First Amendment doctrine in several important
areas,40 it has not completely displaced separationist thinking, and both
paradigms remain prominent undercurrents throughout Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause doctrine.41 Separationist thinking remains an
important force in the contexts of government sponsorship of religious

34. Id.
35. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (incorporating Establishment
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating Free Exercise Clause).
36. See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 29, at 1071–72; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1802
(“By the turn of the millennium, several of the building blocks in the edifice of Separationism had
crumbled, and a competing paradigm of Neutrality or evenhandedness between religion and
secularity had taken center stage.”).
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802), available at
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
38. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
39. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
40. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1802–03 (describing the neutrality paradigm’s effect on
the adjudication of internal church disputes and on the right of religiously oriented speakers to
access forums of public speech).
41. See id. at 1803 (“This movement toward Neutrality, though sweeping, has remained
incomplete.”); see also Gedicks, supra note 29, at 1089 (“[F]or a time it seemed that neutrality
analysis would wholly displace separation analysis under the Establishment Clause. But complete
displacement never occurred.”).
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speech42 and direct government aid to religious organizations.43 But
Supreme Court cases such as Lemon v. Kurtzman,44 Employment
Division v. Smith,45 and Jones v. Wolf 46 exemplify a marked departure
from the separationist regime and signify the Court’s increased
willingness to interpret the First Amendment’s mandates flexibly in the
context of generally applicable laws that incidentally affect religious
organizations.47 Recognizing this modern shift towards neutrality is
essential to understanding the appropriate role for courts hearing
common-law claims against religious organizations.
2.

The Establishment Clause Prohibits States from Endorsing or
Inhibiting Religion in Either Purpose or Effect and from Becoming
Excessively Entangled with Religion

The first clause of the First Amendment prohibits government from
passing laws “respecting an establishment of religion.”48 In addition to
prohibiting the outright establishment of a state church or state religion,
the Establishment Clause prohibits the “sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity,”49 which
“history shows [the founders] regarded as very important and fraught
with great dangers.”50 In accord with this separationist principle, the
Supreme Court has traditionally taken a skeptical view of government
activity that tends to endorse, favor, or promote religion.51 The Supreme
Court’s landmark 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman introduced the

42. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301–10 (2000) (addressing
school-sponsored student prayer at public school athletic events); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
586–99 (1992) (addressing prayer at public school commencement); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 55–61 (1985) (addressing moments of silence at public schools).
43. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
46. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
47. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (“It is a permissible reading of the text . . . to say that if
prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect
of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended.”).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
51. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Ed. Of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“Neither a state
nor the Federal Government . . . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another . . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions . . . .”).
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rhetoric of neutrality to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, requiring
only that state and federal laws have a secular legislative purpose, a
“principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,”52
and that they not foster “an excessive government entanglement with
religion.”53 Determining whether a state’s entanglement with religion is
excessive requires examination of “the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority.”54 This nuanced determination depends heavily on
the factual circumstances and interests involved in the particular case.55
Though Lemon v. Kurtzman has been criticized by members of the Court
for its uncertainty,56 its neutrality-oriented analysis continues to provide
the dominant framework that courts use to determine whether
government has ventured into religious territory in violation of the First
Amendment.57
3.

The Free Exercise Clause Prohibits States from Regulating
Religious Beliefs, but Does Not Prohibit Neutral and Generally
Applicable Laws That Incidentally Affect Religious Conduct

The second clause of the First Amendment prohibits government
from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.58 The Free Exercise
Clause protects the right to “believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires,”59 and thus serves to bar “any governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such.”60 The Free Exercise Clause also

52. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
53. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
54. Id. at 615.
55. See id. at 614 (“[T]he line of separation, far from being a ‘wall,’ is a blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.”).
56. See, e.g., Tangipahoa Parish Bd. Of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Like a majority of the Members of this Court, I have
previously expressed my disapproval of the Lemon test. I would grant certiorari in this case if only
to take the opportunity to inter the Lemon test once for all.” (internal citations omitted)).
57. See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–65
(2005) (applying Lemon analysis in challenge to posting of Ten Commandments in Kentucky
courtrooms); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 669–71 (2002) (applying Lemon analysis in
challenge to Ohio scholarship program); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1997) (applying
Lemon framework in Establishment Clause challenge to Title I of New York Elementary and
Secondary Education Act).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
60. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (emphasis in original).
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imposes additional limits on government’s ability to enact laws that
incidentally burden religious conduct.61 The precise extent of these
limits have fluctuated over time and have historically been the locus of
prominent Free Exercise disputes.62
The Supreme Court first examined the issue of state burdens on
religious conduct in Reynolds v. United States,63 which held that
territorial governments could constitutionally apply laws against
polygamy to individuals whose religious beliefs required the practice.64
The Court reasoned that to permit religious beliefs to trump criminal
laws “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.”65 Under Reynolds, federal and state
governments were free to pass laws that incidentally impacted religious
beliefs and practices, provided that such laws were generally applicable
and not targeted at a specific religious group.66
Under the Warren Court’s rights-expanding view of constitutional
interpretation during the mid-twentieth century, the Court began to take
a more critical view of government’s ability to create laws impacting
religion. The noteworthy 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner67 established a
strict scrutiny approach to laws that negatively affected the exercise of
religion.68 Under the Sherbert test, laws imposing an incidental burden
on the free exercise of an individual’s religion are constitutionally
permissible only if they are “justified by a ‘compelling state interest in
the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to
regulate.’”69 During the decades when the Sherbert test dominated Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence,70 it was not enough that a law or
61. See id. at 403.
62. See generally Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940)
(collecting early Free Exercise Clause cases addressing incidental impacts on religiously motivated
conduct).
63. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
64. Id. at 166-67.
65. Id. at 167.
66. See id. at 166–67.
67. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
68. See id. at 403; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141
(1987) (under Sherbert, state laws burdening religion “must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could
be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest”).
69. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”).
70. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873–84 (1990)
(discussing history and application of the Sherbert test).
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regulation be facially neutral for it to be constitutionally permissible.71 A
law could still violate the Free Exercise Clause if the level of adverse
religious impact it caused outweighed the state’s interest in passing it.72
The Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith
rejected the “compelling interest” standard of the Sherbert test,
embracing instead what is essentially a return to the Reynolds approach
of refusing to exempt religious exercise from “valid and neutral laws of
general applicability.”73 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia read the
Sherbert test as limited to the narrow context of unemployment
compensation,74 and distinguished cases employing the Sherbert test as
“hybrid” cases involving additional constitutional rights such as the
freedom of speech.75 The Smith majority discarded Sherbert’s strict
scrutiny approach76 and rejected the dissent’s proposal to retain the
Sherbert test in limited circumstances where the prohibited conduct is
“central” to the individual’s religion.77 According to the concurrence, the
Smith decision marked a “dramatic[] depart[ure] from well-settled First
Amendment jurisprudence” that is “incompatible with our Nation’s
fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty.”78

71. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (“A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.” (citing Sherbert , 374 U.S. at 398)).
72. See id.
73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)); see also id. at 878 (“It is a permissible reading of the text . . . to say that if prohibiting
the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”
(emphasis added)).
74. See id. at 883–84.
75. Id. at 881–82.
76. Id. at 884–86.
77. Id. at 886–87.
78. Id. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In direct response to Smith, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993) (“RFRA”). See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (“Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to our decision in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.”). Employing language from the
Sherbert majority opinion, RFRA was a legislative attempt to reinstate the compelling interest test
for laws incidentally burdening the free exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1)(a) and (b)
(“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless] it demonstrates that application of the
burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means
of furthering that . . . interest.”). The attack on RFRA was “quick and decisive.” Trinity Assembly
of God of Balt. City v. People’s Counsel for Balt. County, 962 A.2d 404, 425 (Md. 2008). Four
years after Smith, the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to state governments in City of
Boerne v. Flores. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; see also Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside,
366 F.3d 1214, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[B]y enacting RFRA, Congress had exceeded [its] authority
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Jones v. Wolf Establishes That Courts May Hear Common-Law
Suits Against Religious Organizations If They Can Be Adjudicated
Based on Neutral Principles of Law

While the First Amendment doctrine discussed above involves
statutory laws that impact religiously grounded conduct, an analogous
line of First Amendment cases, culminating with the Supreme Court’s
1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf, addresses the constitutionality of
common-law suits against religious organizations. In Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,79 the United States Supreme Court
reviewed a decision of the Illinois State Supreme Court enjoining a
hierarchical church from defrocking a bishop during the course of a
protracted internal dispute within the church.80 The Court reversed the
Illinois court’s detailed review of the church tribunal’s decision on the
grounds that “[t]o permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the
allocation of power . . . would violate the First Amendment in much the
same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.”81 Because
resolving the ecclesiastical dispute would necessarily require
interpretation of church doctrine, First Amendment principles prohibited
the state court’s review of the church tribunal’s decision.82 Serbian
Orthodox Diocese affirms a broad “ecclesiastical immunity” precluding
review of internal church disputes,83 and is the source of related
doctrines like the “ministerial exception” to Title VII sexual harassment
claims.84
by defining rights instead of simply enforcing them.” (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532)
(emphasis in original)). RFRA remains valid in application to federal statutes, see Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–34 (2006) (applying RFRA’s
“compelling interest” standard to Free Exercise challenge to federal Controlled Substances Act), but
after City of Boerne, state laws that burden religious exercise have been evaluated under Smith’s
permissive “neutral laws of general applicability” test. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (“[A]s
the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is this
Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”).
79. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
80. Id. at 698.
81. Id. at 709 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396
U.S. 367, 369 (1970)).
82. Id. (“[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil
courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts
shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical
polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them . . . .” (citing Md. & Va. Churches, 396
U.S. at 369)).
83. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 726–27 (1871).
84. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[C]ourts
have crafted a ‘ministerial exception’ to Title VII ‘in order to insulate the relationship between a

082610 Sheridan Final.doc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

STAYING NEUTRAL

8/30/2010 8:15 AM

529

The Supreme Court refined the rule of Serbian Orthodox Diocese
several years later in Jones v. Wolf. While reaffirming Serbian Orthodox
Diocese’s mandate that civil courts may not resolve internal church
disputes by examining religious doctrine and practice, the Jones Court
held that states were free to apply “neutral principles of law” in
adjudicating church property disputes.85 Under this neutral principles
analysis, courts asked to hear common-law claims against religious
organizations are not required to adopt a “rule of compulsory deference”
to religious autonomy,86 but can examine church documents such as
constitutions or trust instruments so long as they “take special care to
scrutinize the document in purely secular terms.”87 After Jones v. Wolf,
the First Amendment does not provide religious organizations with a
blanket defense to lawsuits brought under neutral laws of general
applicability.88
The Jones Court’s “neutral principles of law” approach suggests that
civil courts can permissibly adjudicate religious disputes by adopting
principles that are “completely secular in operation, and yet flexible
enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and
polity.”89 The rise of neutral principles analysis illustrates the general
shift from separationism to neutrality,90 and parallels the Sherbert-Smith
shift in Free Exercise Clause doctrine.91 Jones v. Wolf’s general holding
that courts may apply “neutral principles of law” in adjudicating church
property disputes remains the dominant framework employed in
analyzing First Amendment challenges to common-law actions and has

religious organization and its ministers from constitutionally impermissible interference by the
government.’” (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir.
1999))); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic Univ. of Az., 83 F.3d 455,
467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the ministerial exception survives Smith).
85. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–03 (1979).
86. Id. at 605.
87. Id. at 604.
88. See id. at 606 (“The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to ‘inhibit’ the free exercise of
religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law . . . .”).
89. Id. at 603. The term “neutral principles of law” was coined by Herbert Wechsler in his 1959
Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Though Professor Wechsler’s view was premised
on the anachronistic view that Article III’s jurisdictional grants imposed a mandatory duty on
courts to hear certain claims, it has continued to be extremely influential in both the derivation and
application of constitutional principles. See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (discussing the influence and application of
Wechsler’s neutral principles concept).
90. See supra Part II.A.i.
91. See supra notes 67–78 and accompanying text.

082610 Sheridan Final.doc (Do Not Delete)

8/30/2010 8:15 AM

530

[Vol. 85:517

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

permitted courts to hear negligent supervision claims against religious
organizations.92
III. STATE COURTS APPLY THREE DISTINCT APPROACHES
TO FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION CLAIMS
The tension between the ecclesiastical immunity doctrine of Serbian
Orthodox Diocese and the neutral principles analysis of Jones v. Wolf
represents the major First Amendment conflict for courts hearing
negligent supervision claims against religious organizations.93 Because
the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the
First Amendment protects religious organizations from tort liability
when a religious leader engages in sexual misconduct towards a third
person,94 state courts attempting to reconcile these conflicting
approaches in the context of negligent supervision claims have reached a
variety of outcomes.95
92. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320–21 (Colo. 1993) (applying Jones v.
Wolf analysis in negligent supervision claim against Colorado church); see also Doe v. Hartz, 970 F.
Supp. 1375, 1431–32 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (applying neutral principles analysis in negligent
supervision claim against Iowa diocese); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (E.D.
Mich. 1995) (applying neutral principles analysis in negligent supervision claim against Michigan
and Wisconsin churches).
93. See supra Part II.B. While states are constitutionally permitted to provide differing levels of
rights and protections in their own constitutions, the First Amendment represents an outer limit on
state governments’ ability to create laws “respecting” religion. See, e.g., Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S.
637, 639 (1983) (per curiam) (Burger, J., concurring) (“With our dual system of state and federal
laws, administered by parallel state and federal courts, different standards may arise in various
areas. But when state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitution
requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to
ensure rational law enforcement.” (emphasis in original)). Furthermore, because the First
Amendment’s religion clauses impose two competing imperatives, states’ freedom to provide
differing levels of protection are pinioned by the dual boundaries of protection and establishment.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
94. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson,
J., dissenting) (“It is generally acknowledged that this area of First Amendment law is in flux and
the United States Supreme Court cases offer very limited guidance.”); see also Swanson v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 446–47 (Me. 1997) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that
negligent supervision claims against religious organizations are “an area of the law in which the
U.S. Supreme Court cases offer limited guidance and there remains significant doctrinal
uncertainty”).
95. See Doe v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“[G]iven the delicate
balance between religious freedom and the protection of the public safety, there is considerable
diversity in the judicial analysis employed by the different courts.”); see also Joseph B. Conder,
Annotation, Liability of Church or Religious Society for Sexual Misconduct of Clergy, 5 A.L.R. 5TH
530 (1992) (describing various approaches to religious organization liability for clergy sexual
misconduct).
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The simplest approaches to determining whether civil courts may
entertain negligent supervision claims against religious entities are
categorical:96 states either recognize a complete bar on such claims or
adopt a permissive regime allowing all negligent supervision claims to
reach a jury.97 Courts that find religious organizations categorically
immune from negligent employment torts justify such a bar in two main
ways. One group holds that these claims contravene Jones v. Wolf
because reaching findings on the elements of such claims would
necessarily require examination of religious doctrine, policy, and
administration.98 A second group finds these claims would violate the
Establishment Clause because judicial inquiry would result in state
endorsement of one model of clergy supervision, excessively entangling
the court with religion.99 Courts adopting a categorical bar overlook the
fact that claims against religious organizations are appropriate for
judicial resolution if they can be resolved on “neutral principles of
law.”100 Furthermore, such a bar affords religious organizations an overinclusive penumbra of immunity from the legitimate claims of
profoundly injured plaintiffs who often lack any other viable cause of
action.101
Conversely, some state courts have categorically rejected any concept
of First Amendment immunity from generally applicable norms of tort
law.102 This approach rests on a broad interpretation of the neutral
principles framework and the premise that religious organizations should
be treated identically to secular organizations for the purpose of
96. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1850 (“When faced with claims that a religious
institution has failed to exercise due care in the employment of a religious leader, courts tend to
proceed on an all-or-nothing basis.”).
97. See id. at 1849–58 (discussing the “categorical approaches” to the negligent employment torts
in detail).
98. See, e.g., Swanson, 692 A.2d at 444 (“To determine the existence of an agency relationship
based on actual authority, the trial court will most likely have to examine church doctrine governing
the church’s authority over [the priest].”).
99. See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (“[J]udicial inquiry into hiring,
ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model
for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy.” (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232
(1997))).
100. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1871 & nn.306–28 (discussing the use of “neutral
principles” of law to guide construction of religious texts).
101. See id. at 1858 (“At the most basic level, plaintiffs often have experienced profound, lasting
injuries from sexual molestation, and the religious institution frequently represents the only viable
source of remedy for the harm they have suffered.”).
102. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320–21 (Colo. 1993) (“Application of a
secular standard to secular conduct that is tortious is not prohibited by the Constitution.”); see also
Enderle v. Trautman, No. CIV.13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145, at *8–10 (D.N.D. 2001).
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adjudicating negligent supervision claims.103 Courts that apply this
approach focus on the distinction between external and internal religious
disputes highlighted in Serbian Eastern Orthodox,104 and find that
negligent supervision claims are always “external” disputes appropriate
for judicial review.105 Like the categorical bar approach, however, this
approach is problematic.106 By treating requisite elemental inquiries—
such as an organization’s structure—as if they were ordinary questions
of fact,107 the categorical “no immunity” approach ignores the Supreme
Court’s evidentiary mandate in Jones v. Wolf.108 Commentators argue
that this over-inclusive approach both creates incentives for religious
organizations to reconfigure their internal structure so as to defeat
liability, and leads to imposition of special ecclesiastical liability by
juries.109
Courts that reject these two categorical approaches generally examine
negligent supervision claims under a more deliberate neutral principles
analysis, focusing on whether determining the tort’s elements would
necessarily require interpretation of religious doctrine.110 A prominent
example of this is the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Malicki v.
Doe,111 which held that negligence claims against a Florida church were
not barred because they could be adjudicated through the application of
neutral principles of tort law.112 Under this “true neutral principles”
103. See Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (justifying adjudication on
the basis that “[t]he court is simply applying secular standards to secular conduct which is
permissible under First Amendment standards” (citing Moses, 863 P.2d at 321)).
104. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
105. See Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D.R.I. 1997) (“[A] dispute between church
officials and third persons who allege that they were seriously injured by the negligence of the
church officials . . . hardly can be characterized as a dispute involving an internal church matter.”
(emphasis in original)).
106. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1856 (describing the role of juries under the categorical
no-immunity approach as “constitutionally troublesome”).
107. See, e.g., Enderle, 2001 WL 1820145, at *9 (“[W]hether [the religious leader] was an
employee of the [religious organization] is a question of fact properly resolved by a jury.”).
108. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at
1854–56 (discussing the over-inclusive effect of the categorical no-immunity approach).
109. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1856 (“A legal rule that provides religious
organizations with no constitutional immunity from liability for negligent employment of clergy
may thus lead, with some predictable frequency, to the imposition of undeserved liability for failure
to act as a ‘reasonable religious organization’ should.”).
110. See id. at 1877–78.
111. 814 So.2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
112. See id. at 361 (“Through neutral application of principles of tort law, we thus give no greater
or lesser deference to tortious conduct committed on third parties by religious organizations than we
do to tortious conduct committed on third parties by non-religious entities.”).
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approach, the court makes an initial inquiry to determine whether the
claim can be adjudicated on the basis of generally applicable, secular
norms, or whether the organization’s religious tenets must be
examined.113 This approach is highly fact-specific and requires a
preliminary case-by-case inquiry into whether the claim’s elements
necessarily implicate the religious doctrine at issue.114 The “true neutral
principles” approach is faithful to the Supreme Court’s directive in Jones
v. Wolf that courts refuse to “adopt a rule of compulsory deference.”
State courts adopting either categorical approach risk neglecting the
Court’s mandate of careful and reasoned First Amendment analysis.
IV. WASHINGTON COURTS DECIDING NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION CLAIMS AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE RECOGNIZED A BROAD LEVEL
OF FIRST AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
In C.J.C. v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima,115 the
Washington State Supreme Court recognized the viability of negligent
supervision claims against religious organizations, holding that the
hierarchical church had a duty to prevent its employees from causing
harm to foreseeable victims.116 However, two subsequent court of
appeals cases have rejected similar claims on First Amendment
grounds.117 This pair of cases, decided in close temporal proximity with
the state supreme court’s decision in C.J.C., establishes precedent
instructing lower courts to reject negligent supervision claims against
religious organizations.

113. See, e.g., Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323 (Colo. 1996)
(finding no First Amendment bar to a negligent hiring claim because “the court does not inquire into
the employer’s broad reasons for choosing this particular employee for the position, but instead
looks to whether the specific danger which ultimately manifested itself could have reasonably been
foreseen at the time of hiring” (quoting Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1132–33 n.17 (1996))).
114. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213, 1242 (Miss.
2005) (allowing negligent supervision claim against religious organization with the caveat that “our
holding today is not to be blindly applied, allowing in all cases the exercise of jurisdiction over a
particular cause of action. Rather, each cause of action asserted against a religious organization
claiming First Amendment protection, must be evaluated according to its particular facts.”).
115. 138 Wash. 2d 699, 985 P.2d 262 (1999).
116. Id. at 728, 985 P.2d at 277.
117. See infra Parts IV.B. and C.
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The Washington State Supreme Court Adopted the “True Neutral
Principles” Approach in C.J.C., Allowing a Negligent Supervision
Claim Against a Religious Organization

In C.J.C. v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, the
Washington State Supreme Court heard three consolidated appeals of
plaintiffs alleging claims against religious organizations.118 In discussing
issues specific to one of these cases, Funkhouser v. Wilson, the C.J.C.
Court held that religious organizations owe a duty of due care to
foreseeable victims of sexual misconduct by church officials.119 Citing
the presence of special relationships between the church, the deacon
performing the alleged acts, and the plaintiffs,120 the state supreme court
rejected the notion of a categorical bar to the adjudication of negligent
supervision claims against religious entities.121 Analogizing negligent
supervision claims against religious organizations to those against school
districts,122 the Court rejected the church’s First Amendment defense on
the basis that “to hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious
leader in a preferred position in our society.”123 The C.J.C. court also
referred to the Washington State Constitution in rejecting the church’s
religious freedom argument, but focused its analysis on federal First
Amendment principles.124
C.J.C. establishes that religious organizations owe a duty under
Washington law to prevent harm to foreseeable victims of their
employees’ torts.125 In rejecting the two categorical approaches to First
Amendment analysis discussed above,126 C.J.C. represents the Court’s
118. C.J.C., 138 Wash. 2d at 705–07, 985 P.2d at 265–66.
119. Id. at 727, 985 P.2d at 276 (“We, therefore, conclude [the defendants] owed a duty of
reasonable care to affirmatively act to prevent the harm, in view of their relationship to the
plaintiffs, their relationship to [the deacon], and given the knowledge they allegedly possessed.”).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 727–28, 985 P.2d at 277 (“The First Amendment does not provide churches with
absolute immunity to engage in tortious conduct.”).
122. See id. at 723, 985 P.2d at 274 (citing Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995)).
123. Id. at 728, 985 P.2d at 277 (quoting Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331,
336 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also id. at 724, 985 P.2d at 275 (“[W]e simply do not agree with the
Church that its duty to take protective action was arbitrarily relieved at the church door.”).
124. See id. at 728, 985 P.2d at 277 (“Similarly, while art. I, § 11 of our state constitution protects
‘[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment,’ that protection ‘shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the state.’ Thus, the specific language of art. I, § 11 defeats the Church’s state
constitutional claims.”).
125. Id. at 727, 985 P.2d at 276.
126. See supra Part III.
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adoption of the “true neutral principles” approach.127 Provided that the
employment and control elements of negligent supervision claims can be
determined without reference to church doctrine, the elements of
knowledge and proximate cause are questions of fact properly decided
by a jury.128 A parallel line of Washington appellate cases, however, has
employed broad language in affirming grants of summary judgment to
religious organizations, such that Washington law arguably now
recognizes a de facto First Amendment bar to negligent supervision
claims against religious entities, in direct conflict with C.J.C.
B.

In Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church, the Washington Court of
Appeals Applied Establishment Clause Language in Finding a
Negligent Supervision Claim Barred by the First Amendment

In Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church,129 the Washington Court of
Appeals considered the claims of three female parishioners against
Pullman Baptist Church and its former pastor David Leach.130 The three
women were members of the church who had received counseling from
Pastor Leach during the 1980s, and each alleged that he had engaged in
improper sexual conduct during the course of the counseling
relationship.131 In addition to claims for breach of fiduciary duty against
the pastor, the women asserted a negligent supervision claim against the
church, alleging that the church had been negligent in retaining the
pastor after having notice that he posed a risk of harm to parishioners.132
The Germain trial court granted summary judgment to the church for
two reasons.133 First, it found the plaintiffs’ claim against the church to
be time-barred.134 Second, the court held that by asserting a negligent
supervision claim against a religious organization, the plaintiffs had not

127. See supra notes 110–114 and accompanying text.
128. See C.J.C., 138 Wash. 2d at 727, 985 P.2d at 276 (“Whether there was a causal connection
between the harm and the fact of Wilson’s position in the Church, or whether the risk of harm was
or should have been reasonably foreseen at the time the harm occurred, are questions of fact to be
determined by the jury.”).
129. 96 Wash. App. 826, 980 P.2d 809 (1999), review denied, 139 Wash. 2d 1026, 994 P.2d 844
(2000).
130. Id. at 828, 980 P.2d at 810.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 829, 980 P.2d at 810–11. The trial court also found the breach of fiduciary duty
claim against the pastor barred by the statute of limitations, and granted him summary judgment. Id.
134. Id.

082610 Sheridan Final.doc (Do Not Delete)

8/30/2010 8:15 AM

536

[Vol. 85:517

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.135 Despite evidence
that church authorities had knowledge of Pastor Leach’s predatory
conduct,136 the trial court held that both fashioning a standard of care for
the pastor’s work (duty element) and determining whether the church
was responsible for supervising the pastor (employment element) would
violate the First Amendment.137
The court of appeals issued its judgment just two days before the
Washington State Supreme Court decided C.J.C.138 Framing its inquiry
as whether the court should “recognize a cause of action for a church’s
negligent supervision of a pastor,” the court affirmed both of the trial
court’s holdings.139 Because the church constitution provided that the
pastor was to be hired or fired by a majority vote of the congregation,
the court found that determining whether the church had authority over
Pastor Leach would require the impermissible interpretation of church
doctrine.140 In reaching this determination, the court discussed the
religious doctrine implicated by the employment element, concluding
that
[i]n this case, the authority, as the pastor’s employer, belongs to
all of the Church’s members, who must act by majority rule if
they are to discharge him or otherwise control his conduct. The
determination of whether to impose liability on a church where
the authority is so diffused would require the court to consider
and interpret the church’s laws and constitution.141
By discussing the relevant religious doctrine implicated by the elements
of the plaintiff’s claim, the court seemed to make a preliminary
determination regarding whether the case could be adjudicated based on
neutral principles of law.142 But in explaining its refusal to subject the
church to tort liability, the court refers not to the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Jones v. Wolf or to neutral principles analysis, but
instead to cases from Wisconsin and Maine for the proposition that “[t]o
135. Id.
136. See id. at 835–36, 980 P.2d at 814.
137. Id. at 829, 980 P.2d at 811.
138. Germain was decided on July 27, 1999, and C.J.C. was decided on July 29, 1999 and
amended September 8, 1999. See Germain, 96 Wash. App. 826, 980 P.2d 809; C.J.C. v. Corp. of the
Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 729, 985 P.2d 262, 277 (1999).
139. Germain, 96 Wash. App. at 835, 980 P.2d at 814 (emphasis added).
140. See id. at 836, 980 P.2d at 814 (“The congregation chooses the pastor at a meeting called by
the board of deacons” and the church “constitution also provides that the congregation, by a vote of
at least 51 percent, may terminate the pastor.”).
141. Id. at 837, 980 P.2d at 815.
142. See supra Part II.B.
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do so would violate the First Amendment by entangling the judiciary
with religion.”143 The Germain court’s use of the word “entanglement”
suggests that it is analyzing the claim under Establishment Clause
doctrine144—language that is wholly absent from the state supreme
court’s decision in C.J.C. Though Germain was decided prior to the
Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in C.J.C., and seems at
odds with C.J.C.’s holding, it remains “good law” and was discussed in
the next Washington Court of Appeals negligent supervision case
involving a religious organization.145
C.

In S.H.C. v. Lu, the Washington Court of Appeals Again Employed
Broad Establishment Clause Language in Refusing to Hear a
Negligent Supervision Claim

The Washington Court of Appeals again considered the interaction of
negligent supervision claims and the First Amendment three years later
in S.H.C. v. Lu.146 S.H.C., an adult woman, asserted various claims
against the Ling Shen Ching Tze Temple, Inc. (“Temple”) based on
sexual acts committed by the temple’s leader, Grandmaster Sheng-Yen
Lu (“Grandmaster Lu”).147 After several years as a parishioner at the
Temple, S.H.C. visited Grandmaster Lu to receive healing blessings for
her chronic headaches.148 Grandmaster Lu informed S.H.C. that not only
did she suffer from headaches, but that she was also “near death,” a fate
he could deter with his special “Twin Body Blessing.”149 Grandmaster
Lu’s “‘blessing’ was, in fact, sexual intercourse,” a ruse he successfully
perpetrated for over two years.150
The trial court granted the Temple summary judgment on all claims
against it,151 and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the First
Amendment barred S.H.C.’s negligent supervision claim.152 Just as in
143. Germain, 96 Wash. App. at 837, 980 P.2d at 815 (emphasis added) (citing L.L.N. v.
Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Wis. 1997); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441
(Me. 1997)).
144. See supra Part II.A.ii.
145. See S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash. App. 511, 520, 54 P.3d 174, 178 (2002) (describing Germain
as decided “at about the same time as the C.J.C. decision.”).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 515, 54 P.3d at 175.
148. Id. at 515, 54 P.3d at 175.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 515, 54 P.3d at 176.
151. Id. at 516, 54 P.3d at 176.
152. Id. at 518, 54 P.3d at 177.

082610 Sheridan Final.doc (Do Not Delete)

8/30/2010 8:15 AM

538

[Vol. 85:517

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Germain, the record contained considerable evidence that Temple
leaders were aware of Grandmaster Lu’s sexual relationship with
S.H.C.,153 and that Temple officials had a sufficient degree of authority
over Grandmaster Lu to create genuine issues of fact regarding the
presence of an employment relationship.154 Distinguishing C.J.C., the
court explained that to determine whether the Temple was negligent in
its supervision of Grandmaster Lu would require the interpretation of
religious doctrine, which would “excessively entangle the court with
religion.”155 The S.H.C. court also distinguished C.J.C. on the basis of
the age of the plaintiffs, citing the C.J.C. court’s reference to the state
legislature’s “strong public policies” in support of preventing the sexual
abuse of children.156
In addition to this broad Establishment Clause justification, the court
ostensibly performed a Jones v. Wolf analysis, finding that there were
“no neutral principles of law governing this case that would permit a
civil court to resolve the question of liability against the Temple.”157 In
describing why the case necessarily required interpretation of religious
doctrine, the court discussed the religious principles of Grandmaster
Lu’s True Buddha School in detail.158 Followers of the Temple “regard
Grandmaster Lu as a Living Buddha—one to whom they have an
obligation of obedience.”159 Furthermore, Temple doctrine requires
followers to “‘see only good qualities in [Grandmaster Lu], and never
any faults,’” and dictates that “‘one should not criticize or slander the
former Guru.’”160 The court reasoned that because of the extreme
obedience and deference required of Temple followers, adjudicating the
plaintiff’s claim would necessarily require rulings on matters beyond the
scope of proper judicial inquiry.161
In making its neutral principles finding, however, the court framed the
153. See id. at 518, 54 P.3d at 177 (“S.H.C. testified that Temple officials were aware that her
interactions with Grandmaster Lu were ‘out of the ordinary or unacceptable for interactions by
followers . . . . This evidence is sufficient to create a factual issue that the Temple was on notice of
Grandmaster Lu’s activities, subject only to the question of whether the factual issue is material for
summary judgment purposes.”).
154. See id. (“S.H.C. did introduce evidence that the Temple officials had the authority to exclude
Grandmaster Lu from the Temple grounds.”).
155. Id. at 522, 54 P.3d at 179.
156. Id. at 521, 54 P.3d at 178–79.
157. Id. at 523, 54 P.3d at 179.
158. Id. at 522, 54 P.3d at 179.
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 522–23, 54 P.3d at 179.
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negligence standard as requiring the court to develop an impermissible
“reasonable religious organization standard”162 and evaluate “the truth of
the above beliefs.”163 The court stated that “there is danger that the
standard would vary, for example, from a ‘reasonable Protestant’
standard, a ‘reasonable Catholic’ standard, or a ‘reasonable Islamic’
standard.”164 In performing its neutral principles analysis, the S.H.C.
court focused on whether the relevant religious doctrine would
necessarily “entangle” it with religion; under a “true neutral principles”
analysis, the court would focus on whether the elements of the claim
necessarily implicate religious doctrine.165
V.

WHEN NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CLAIMS CAN BE
DECIDED ON NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW,
WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD ADJUDICATE THEM

The Germain and S.H.C. courts’ use of Establishment Clause
language and focus on religious doctrine creates broad First Amendment
protection for religious organizations defending negligent supervision
claims. These cases should be read as limited to their factual
circumstances both (1) to avoid violating the Establishment Clause and
(2) to preserve an essential legal mechanism for the remedy and
prevention of sexual misconduct. To this end, Washington courts should
also articulate a clear statement of the appropriate neutral principles
analysis, refrain from discussing Establishment Clause principles, and
focus the preliminary inquiry solely on the elements of the plaintiff’s
claim.
A.

Germain and S.H.C. Create an Overbroad Level of First
Amendment Protection for Religious Entities and Should Be Read
Narrowly

Taken together, Germain and S.H.C. create an overbroad First
Amendment protection for religious entities defending negligent
supervision claims. By cloaking its analysis in the mantle of “excessive
entanglement,”166 the Germain court gives credence to the notion that

162. Id. at 523, 54 P.3d at 179.
163. Id. at 522, 54 P.3d at 179.
164. Id. at 523, 54 P.3d at 179.
165. See supra Part II.B (discussing the United States Supreme Court’s neutral principles analysis
in Jones v. Wolf).
166. Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church, 96 Wash. App. 826, 835, 980 P.2d 809, 814 (1999).
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the Establishment Clause categorically bars negligent supervision claims
against religious entities. This doctrinal signal discourages lower courts
from applying tort principles against religious organizations because,
unlike the case-by-case neutral principles analysis of Jones v. Wolf, the
Establishment Clause functions to categorically prohibit certain types of
government action.167 Though the Germain court claimed to refrain from
deciding “whether the First Amendment forecloses all negligent
supervision claims against churches based on the conduct of their
ministers,”168 its ruling may have effectively done so. The S.H.C. court
also employed Establishment Clause language in rejecting the plaintiff’s
negligent supervision claim, creating further precedent that suggests
such claims are categorically barred. This is precisely the type of First
Amendment shield denounced in Jones v. Wolf.169 By employing the
rhetoric both of the Establishment Clause and of Jones v. Wolf only to
summarily declare S.H.C.’s claim “barred by the First Amendment,”170
the S.H.C. court expedited Washington courts’ drift towards a
categorical immunity regime.
The S.H.C. court took this immunity one step further by focusing its
inquiry on the nature of the Temple’s doctrine and framing the
negligence standard as that of the “reasonable religious organization.”171
The proper Jones v. Wolf analysis focuses on the elements of the cause
of action instead of the doctrine of the affected religion;172 consequently,
the proper standard of care for the duty owed to foreseeable victims
recognized under C.J.C. should be that of the “reasonable employer.”173
By phrasing the inquiry in S.H.C. as pertaining to the truth or conviction
behind the Temple’s belief, and not simply as whether the officials
should have reasonably known of Grandmaster Lu’s misconduct,174 the
court decided the case within an analytical framework that will prevent
civil courts from hearing such claims.175 In essence, the S.H.C. court

167. See supra Part II.A.ii.
168. Germain, 96 Wash. App. at 836–37, 980 P.2d at 815 (emphasis in original).
169. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (“We cannot agree, however, that the First
Amendment requires the States to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in
resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved.”).
170. S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash. App. 511, 523, 54 P.3d 174, 179 (2002).
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
173. See C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 727, 985 P.2d 262,
276 (1999).
174. S.H.C., 113 Wash. App. at 522, 54 P.3d at 179.
175. The S.H.C. court’s concern that applying this “reasonable religious organization” standard to
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found that the case could not be decided on neutral principles of law
because it looked only at religious principles.176
Similarly, the court’s attempt to distinguish C.J.C. on the basis of the
plaintiff’s age is unfounded.177 The court in C.J.C. identified the policy
of protecting children from sexual abuse as one supporting its
decision,178 but did not state that its holding was limited to cases of child
sexual abuse.179 Courts applying S.H.C. have seized upon this
distinction, characterizing S.H.C. as “conclud[ing] there was no similar
special relationship between a church leader and an adult.”180 This
artificial distinction creates a broad religious immunity from negligent
supervision claims made by adults, and greatly expands the First
Amendment protection that Germain and S.H.C. create.
Several cases following S.H.C. have embraced this broad immunity
and cursorily dismissed negligent supervision claims against religious
organizations on First Amendment grounds.181 Because the Washington
State Supreme Court has not reviewed this line of cases,182 it is now
more difficult for a plaintiff to recover on a negligent supervision theory

religious organizations might result in impermissible variation is well-founded, see Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (stating that “[t]he First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion . . .”), but this problem stems from the court’s framing of
the negligence standard, and not from the underlying facts of the case.
176. This is not to say that the Germain and S.H.C. courts necessarily reached the wrong result.
In Germain, the congregation’s “majority rules” approach to control of the pastor indicates that
determination of the authority issue might have required interpretation of church doctrine. See supra
notes 140–141 and accompanying text. Similarly, in S.H.C., allowing a jury to decide whether the
Temple leaders had knowledge of Grandmaster Lu’s misconduct might in essence have required
them to evaluate the verity of the officials’ professed belief in Lu’s infallibility. See supra notes
159–161 and accompanying text. However, paired with its repeated use of Establishment Clause
language, the court’s ultimate disposition of the issue creates the impression that such claims are
categorically barred. In this respect, S.H.C. and Germain may be examples of the adage “hard cases
make bad law.”
177. S.H.C., 113 Wash. App. at 521, 54 P.3d at 178–79.
178. C.J.C., 138 Wash. 2d at 726, 985 P.2d. at 276.
179. Id. at 727, 985 P.2d at 276–77 (“We caution that our holding is limited . . . . [We] do hold
that where a special protective relationship exists, a principal may not turn a blind eye to a known or
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm posed by its agents toward those it would otherwise be required
to protect simply because the injury is arbitrarily perpetrated off premises or after-hours.”).
180. Rose v. Seventh Day Adventists, No. 53424-6-I, 2005 WL 1300805, at *7 n.13 (2005).
181. See, e.g., id. at *5 (citing S.H.C. in dismissing claims against church for negligently
retaining and supervising pastor who failed to warn victim of murder conspiracy); Elvig v. Ackles,
123 Wash. App. 491, 98 P.3d 524 (2004) (rejecting negligent supervision claim on First
Amendment grounds).
182. See S.H.C. v. Lu, 149 Wash. 2d. 1011, 69 P.3d 874 (2003) (denying review); Germain v.
Pullman Baptist Church, 139 Wash. 2d. 1026, 994 P.2d 844 (2000) (denying review).
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against a religious organization in Washington State.183 Courts asked to
hear negligent supervision claims against religious organizations should
read Germain and S.H.C. as examples of cases barred because of their
unique factual circumstances, and not as representing the proposition
that all such claims contravene the First Amendment.
B.

Religious Organizations Should Not Have Broad Immunity Against
Negligent Supervision Claims

There are two prominent reasons why Germain and S.H.C. should be
read as limited to their particular facts. First, providing religious
organizations with an overbroad level of protection risks violating the
Establishment Clause. Second, negligent supervision is an essential
mechanism for providing remedy to victims of clergy sexual misconduct
and incentivizing religious organizations to prevent such conduct.
1.

Providing Religious Organizations with an Overbroad Level of
Protection Violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment

The competing nature of the First Amendment’s two religion
clauses184 requires courts hearing claims against religious organizations
to apply a careful, reasoned approach when determining whether a First
Amendment bar exists. Such analyses typically focus on Free Exercise
Clause principles and question whether placing liability on the religious
entity will unduly restrict the organization’s constitutionally protected
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, however, requires an
equally important consideration; courts focusing only on Free Exercise
Clause principles may go to such lengths to avoid impinging on the
organization’s religious freedom that they impermissibly favor religion
over secular interests.185
The notion that courts can impermissibly “establish” religion through
overprotection can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s discussion in
Reynolds v. U.S., where Justice Waite observed that to permit religious
beliefs to trump generally applicable legal norms “would be to make the
183. See, e.g., Rose, 2005 WL 1300805, at *5 (describing S.H.C. as “controlling” and holding
that “[i]n order to find liability of the Defendants, I would have to ‘entangle {myself} in the
religious percepts and beliefs’ of the Seventh Day Adventist religion and its practices”); Elvig, 123
Wash. App. at 498–99, 98 P.3d at 528.
184. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
185. See supra Part II.A.ii (demonstrating that the Establishment Clause prohibits state laws that
either inhibit or advance religious practice).
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professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”186
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Employment Division v.
Smith187 and City of Boerne,188 noting that recognizing overbroad First
Amendment protection for religiously based conduct would create an
“anomaly in the law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of
general applicability.”189 The perils of such an approach are manifold, as
individuals could potentially concoct religious doctrines shielding them
from any conceivable type of liability.190 Similarly, the Washington
State Supreme Court has recognized that overbroad Free Exercise
Clause protections would “impermissibly place a religious leader in a
preferred position in our society.”191 Regardless of whether the Pullman
Baptist Church or Ling Shen Chin Tze Temple should have received
First Amendment protection, the Germain and S.H.C. courts’ imprecise
neutral principles analyses create precedent for lower courts to exempt
religious organizations from claims of negligent supervision. This
precedent is at odds with the general First Amendment shift towards
neutrality192 and risks creating an impermissible “law respecting an
establishment of religion” by placing religious organizations on a higher
plane than nonreligious entities.
2.

Negligent Supervision Is an Essential Mechanism for Remedying
and Preventing Sexual Misconduct by Religious Leaders

Victims of clergy sexual misconduct can seek redress for the lasting
psychological and emotional injuries they incur by filing tort claims
against religious leaders, or against the religious organizations
employing those leaders. Powerful reasons exist for holding religious
organizations liable for the torts of their employees. First, while religious
leaders typically have modest incomes and reside in homes owned by

186. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878); see also supra note 65 and accompanying
text.
187. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
188. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
189. Id. at 513.
190. See, e.g., Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997) (“It is easy to envision the
kinds of ‘anomalies’ that could result from such an absolutist interpretation of the free exercise
clause. For example, laws prohibiting murder would have no application to human sacrifices
performed pursuant to some religious practice.”).
191. C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 728, 985 P.2d 262,
277 (1999) (quoting Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1998)).
192. See supra Part II.A.i.
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the organization,193 making them immune from significant judgments,
religious organizations are frequently more capable of fulfilling a
judgment debt. Allowing successful plaintiffs to collect from religious
entities’ “deeper pockets” offers victims of sexual misconduct a clear
remedial advantage. Furthermore, because religious organizations are
often in the best position to prevent sexual misconduct by their
leaders,194 placing liability for clergy sexual misconduct on the
organization itself incentivizes the entity to take affirmative steps to
protect its members.
Those injured by clergy sexual misconduct can seek redress against
religious organizations through three main legal theories: breach of
fiduciary duty, vicarious liability, and negligent employment. Of these
options, negligent employment actions often represent the only viable
remedy because courts are extremely reluctant to hear breach of
fiduciary duty claims against religious organizations,195 and vicarious
liability actions almost always fail because sexual misconduct rarely
arises in contexts within the scope of an employee’s duties.196 Within the
negligent employment torts, negligent hiring actions are similarly
doomed because they equate to “negligent ordination” suits requiring the
court to examine the “internal” religious policies of the organization.197
Thus, negligent supervision becomes an essential remedial mechanism
for victims of sexual misconduct by religious leaders, providing a
broader background duty that plaintiffs can fall back on when breach of
fiduciary duty or respondeat superior claims fail. In order for
Washington courts to effectively remedy and prevent the sexual
misconduct of religious leaders, they should not reject negligent
supervision claims based on an overbroad conception of First
Amendment protection.

193. See United States Census Bureau, Earnings By Occupation and Education, Sep. 21, 2009,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/earnings/call2usboth.html (listing 1999 median full-time
year-round clergy income as $31,285).
194. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 1 (citing lack of oversight as a cause of sexual misconduct by
religious leaders).
195. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1835–36 (“A number of courts have dismissed on the
pleadings such claims against religious institutions on the theory that the defendant religious
organization and its representatives have not undertaken any special duties with respect to each and
every adherent of the faith.”).
196. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
197. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 22, at 1846 (“As far as we can tell, no court has permitted a
plaintiff to proceed on a claim that an institution negligently prepared or ordained a candidate for
ministry.”).
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Washington Courts Should Clarify Their Neutral Principles
Analysis and Reaffirm the Viability of Negligent Supervision
Claims Against Religious Organizations

In order to avoid granting an overbroad level of protection to religious
organizations through an expansive reading of Germain and S.H.C.,
Washington courts should articulate an explicit statement of the
appropriate First Amendment analysis. This articulation should be
consistent with the duty to prevent foreseeable harms recognized by the
state supreme court in C.J.C. Current case law gives imprecise direction
to lower courts asked to evaluate the viability of such claims, and creates
little incentive for religious organizations to prevent sexual misconduct
by their leaders. The correct analytical framework would discard any
mention of Establishment Clause doctrine and focus solely on the
question of whether it would be possible to determine the specific
elements of the claim based solely on neutral principles of law.
Under the “true neutral principles” analysis exemplified by cases like
Florida’s Malicki v. Doe198 and C.J.C., courts must make a preliminary
determination of whether adjudicating the specific elements of the
plaintiff’s claim would require the interpretation of religious doctrine.
This analysis should not be phrased as an examination of the verity of
religious doctrine, as in S.H.C.,199 because such inquiries will always
contravene the First Amendment. Rather, courts should look only at the
elements of the tort and determine whether an organization’s conduct
can be evaluated without reference to religious doctrine. In many
instances, courts will be able to evaluate an organization’s conduct in
purely secular terms, and the Free Exercise Clause will not bar a
plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim. The muddled analyses of
Germain and S.H.C. form confusing precedent for lower courts asked to
hear these claims, and create a significant risk that these claims will be
unjustifiably rejected.
CONCLUSION
Sexual misconduct by religious leaders is a prominent problem in
American society, and the tort of negligent supervision is an essential
mechanism both for preventing it and for remedying the harm it causes.

198. Doe v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also supra notes 111–114 and
accompanying text.
199. S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash. App. 511, 523, 54 P.3d 174, 179 (2002); see also supra notes 171–
176 and accompanying text.
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In C.J.C, the Washington State Supreme Court acknowledged the
viability of negligent supervision claims against religious organizations.
However, two subsequent Washington Court of Appeals cases have
rejected similar claims on vague First Amendment grounds, leaving the
status of the state’s law unclear and prone to overprotection of religious
entities. To remedy this overbroad level of First Amendment protection,
Washington courts should adopt a clear statement of the criteria through
which they evaluate First Amendment defenses to neutral laws of
general applicability. The appropriate analysis requires a preliminary
examination of whether elements of the particular case can be decided
solely on neutral principles of law, or whether the elements themselves
necessarily implicate religious doctrine. By articulating the proper
analytical framework for evaluating whether courts can permissibly
adjudicate negligent supervision claims against religious organizations,
Washington courts will both provide a remedy for the serious and lasting
injuries of plaintiffs, and create an incentive for religious organizations
to prevent the foreseeable harms perpetrated by their leaders.

